Tiempo, conocimiento y dinámicas evolutivas: por qué las conexiones tienen importancia
Palabras clave:
Variedad dinámica, Organizaciones, Conocimiento, Instituciones, EvoluciónResumen
El tiempo tiene importancia porque el conocimiento se transforma. La incertidumbre knightiana excluye los procedimientos correctos y el conocimiento comprobado, pero da lugar a la imaginación y a la creatividad, las cuales impulsan el proceso evolutivo. La cognición humana depende menos de la lógica que de la elaboración de patrones; imponemos principios conectivos para establecer patrones y nexos causales entre ellos, como representaciones de fenómenos, las cuales son imperfectas y a menudo están supeditadas a múltiples interpretaciones. Los modelos estables fijan la línea de referencia para la selección. Nuestros modelos personales se complementan con continuidades institucionales; y organizaciones de diversos tipos ayudan a moldear el desarrollo del conocimiento, el cual prospera al establecer conexiones en los diversos márgenes del conocimiento existente.
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