Ganancias de competitividad: un enfoque agregado y de largo plazo
Palabras clave:
delegación, oligopolio, incentivos empresarialesResumen
En este artículo analizamos diversos modelos en que las decisiones empresariales se delegan a administradores con objetivos distintos a la simple maximización de beneficios. Esta delegación tiene un carácter estratégico en un contexto oligopólico, y altera los resultados de los modelos tradicionales tanto en el caso en que las empresas compiten solamente en precios o cantidades, como cuando se agregan dimensiones adicionales de competencia.
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Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0.
