El dilema social de la corrupción: normalización, incentivos y reciprocidad
Palabras clave:
Políticas Anticorrupción, Acción Colectiva, Impunidad, Incentivos, ReciprocidadResumen
El artículo tiene por objeto analizar el fenómeno de la corrupción y el fracaso de las políticas anticorrupción. Como alternativa analítica en torno al combate a la corrupción, el trabajo se enfoca en considerar la posibilidad de la acción colectiva como una forma de participación no institucional, no esperada, que puede romper con las inercias, miedos, pasividad e inacción social frente a la corrupción. Bajo la hipótesis de que el papel de la confianza e integridad de los individuos son condicionantes para la construcción de una acción colectiva capaz de hacer frente a la corrupción, el análisis permite deducir que la efectividad de la acción colectiva en el combate a la corrupción dependerá de su capacidad para conformar decisiones por encima de los incentivos inherentes a la corrupción y de las relaciones recíprocas de los grupos sociales.
Clasificación JEL: C33, D72, O43.
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Derechos de autor 2024 José Luis Hernández Mota
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