The social dilemma of corruption: normalization, incentives and reciprocity
Keywords:
Anti-Corruption Policies, Collective Action, Impunity, Incentives, ReciprocityAbstract
The article aims to establish an overview of the phenomenon of corruption and the failure of anticorruption policies. Analytically the fight against anticorruption focuses on the possibility of collective action as a non-institutional, unexpected form of participation that can break with inertia, fear, passivity, and social inaction in the face of corruption. Under the hypothesis that the role of trust and integrity of individuals are conditioning factors for the construction of a collective action capable of dealing with corruption, the analysis allows us to deduce that the effectiveness of collective action in the fight against corruption will depend on their ability to shape decisions, over and above the incentives inherent to corruption and the reciprocal relationships of social groups.
JEL Classification: C33, D72, O43.
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